We illustrate general techniques for assessing dynamic stability in games of incomplete information by re-analyzing two models of preference evolution, the Arce (2007) employerworker game and the Friedman and Singh (2009) Noisy Trust game. The techniques include extensions of replicator and gradient dynamics, and for both models they confirm local stability of the key static equilibria. That is, we obtain convergence in time average for initial conditions sufficiently near equilibrium values.
1
Standard equilibrium concepts, such as Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium, offer sophisticated formulations of what one might hope to see in games of incomplete information.
These equilibrium concepts, however, beg the crucial dynamical question: would human players ever actually reach such an equilibrium, or even get close?
For games of complete information, such questions of dynamic stability have been addressed in a principled way by evolutionary game theory. That theory shows that certain subsets of Nash equilibrium (e.g., Evolutionary Stable States, ESS) are indeed reachable by players using simple adaptation rules (e.g., replication, imitation or learning); see, for example Weibull (1995) , Friedman (1991) and Sandholm (2010) for games in normal form and Cressman (2003) for games in extensive form. For games of incomplete information, however, dynamic stability questions remain largely unresolved.
The present paper addresses those questions. It does not prove new general results nor offer new models, but it does show how to extend dynamics (specifically, replicator and gradient dynamics) from games of complete information to games of incomplete information. In some cases the extensions continue to yield systems of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) but in other cases they yield partial differential equations (PDEs), and the stability properties of these systems can be investigated analytically or numerically.
The dynamical systems that we propose endogenize the evolution of types. In that sense they go beyond recent studies of dynamic stability of games of incomplete information that hold fixed the distribution of types in order to focus on the adaptation of beliefs and/or actions. These recent studies include Ely and Sandholm (2005) , which uses best-response dynamics; Cressman (2003, Section 4.7.2) and Amann and Possajennikov (2009) which apply replicator dynamics. The present paper greatly extends the approach of Possajennikov (2005) , who fixes a discrete set of four types in Prisoner's Dilemma and Hawk-Dove games in complete and incomplete information environments, and uses replicator dynamics to endogenize the shares of the alternative types.
In the present paper we embed the types in a continuous type space and allow them to evolve (slowly) via gradient dynamics, while replicator dynamics describe the rapid adaptation of individual behavior. Endogenizing the set of types sharpens the model's predictions and may enhance the applicability of evolutionary game theory when information is imperfect. In some applications, 2 tremble rates and imperfect observability are key features of the game of incomplete information and we therefore show how to incorporate them into a dynamic specification. On the other hand, we do not explicitly model the adaptation of beliefs; for our applied focus they can be regarded as following the distribution of actions as it evolves.
We take no strong position on which underlying processes govern the evolution of types and actions. It is natural for economists to think of entry and exit as governing type evolution, but other social scientists may regard individual preference types as subject to gradual change or conversion under the influence of role models and peers. For a given type of individual, the distribution of actions can adapt via personal experience of success and failure, or social learning, or even entry and exit. The underlying process determines the precise dynamic specification.
We illustrate the techniques using two recent models of preference formation, Arce (2007) and Friedman and Singh (2009) . Our idea is that generality is best developed from specific instances and we chose these two models as relatively simple instances of the complexities noted two paragraphs earlier. The models both apply the indirect evolution approach to preferences: players of given preference types are matched pairwise to play a game with specified material payoffs. The players adapt actions (on a rapid time scale) so as to maximize expected utility under the given type distribution, while (on slower time scales) the distribution among types and the types themselves evolve according to realized material payoffs. Previous investigations represented indirect evolution in terms of a static notion such as ESS; e.g. see Güth and Yaari (1992) , Ok and VegaRedondo (2001) and Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2007) . Here we will instead use standard dynamic specifications -replicator and gradient -to assess the stability of the relevant equilibria.
Our work draws on several other strands of literature. Our continuous type space is an instance of continuous trait space, for which the static equilibrium concepts of continously stable strategies (CSS) and neighborhood invader stable (NIS) were first introduced respectively by Eshel (1983) and Apaloo (1997) . Later authors, notably Oechssler and Riedel (2002) , Cressman (2005) , and Doebeli and Hauert (2005) , connected these static concepts to dynamic stability under replicator dynamics and Dieckman's canonical dynamics. Friedman and Ostrov (2010, 2013) argue that gradient dynamics are natural when the topology of the continuous action space matters -e.g., when it is easier to evolve (or cheaper to adjust) to a nearby action or trait than to a distant one -and in particular when payoff or fitness is given by the expectation over the current distribution of traits or actions encountered in interactions. Applying the fitness gradient to each action chosen in a large 3 population, they obtain a partial differential equation governing the distribution of actions and note conditions under which the distribution converges asymptotically to a mass point or to a stationary density. Dieckman's canonical dynamics are a variant of gradient dynamics in which the mean of the current action distribution responds to the payoff gradient while the variance remains constant.
We will elaborate on these points (and mention other published work) later when presenting the dynamic analysis.
The presentation begins in Section 2 with Arce's (2007) equilibrium analysis of efficiency wages in a two population game of incomplete information. A population of Workers containing two types (one self-interested and the other autonomy-preferring) is randomly matched pairwise with a population of Employers who cannot observe Worker type. Which preference types and what sort of behavior will survive in the long run? Arce uses static concepts to indentify equilibria and emphasizes the result that increasing the incentive wage can destabilize an efficient equilibrium for some distributions of preference types.
The first step in our analysis is to write out the expected payoff and expected utilities given all state variables, including the population share of each type of Workers, which Arce (2007) takes as exogenous. Then we introduce and analyze a system of four coupled ordinary differential equations (ODEs) that characterizes the evolution of the state variables. That system uses standard replicator dynamics, with fitness given by the realized material payoffs, to model the time path of the population shares. To model the adjustment of strategy mixtures, the ODE system focuses on utility and applies gradient dynamics, which in this context coincides with standard replicator dynamics. The parameters include speed of adjustment, and we emphasize cases where strategy mixture adjustment is faster than the evolution of types.
For some equilibria, eigenvalue techniques allow us to analytically characterize dynamic stability. However, for some key equilibria, these and other tractable analytic techniques are inconclusive. We then rely on numerical solutions of the ODE system and explain why it is appropriate in such cases to focus on time averages. Our results complement and extend those of Arce (2007) and other theoretical work on models of indirect evolution, e.g. Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001) and Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2007) . In particular, we find that both kinds of Workers can coexist in states where the aggregate play corresponds to a Nash equilibrium with selfish preferences. Our simulations also provide insight into how key parameters influence transitory behavior. Section 3 describes the basic trust game and its extension to a game of incomplete information 4 due to Friedman and Singh (2009, henceforth FS09) . They propose a static equilibrium refinement called Evolutionary Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (EPBE) for population games. At EPBE, each surviving type in each population has the same expected material payoff and no potential entrant type has higher payoff.
After writing out the expected payoffs and utilities, we derive a system of six coupled differential equations that characterizes the evolution of the state variables. Five of these equations roughly parallel the ODEs for the Arce (2007) model and the other equation uses gradient dynamics to describe evolution of the preference parameter. In line with FS09 and the previous section, we assume that individuals adjust their strategy mixes rapidly relative to the rate of change in population shares (which adjust via entry and exit, or type switching). We assume that preference parameter adjusts (via genetic disposition and/or internalized norms) at an even slower rate. Our results support the implicit assumption in FS09 that EPBE is dynamically stable. More specifically, we show for reasonable parameters that the time average state converges to the relevant EPBE from initial conditions near the equilibrium value. That is, the "good" EPBE of the noisy trust game is locally stable in time average.
The last section summarizes the findings and offers suggestions for applying the techniques more broadly. The appendix includes the mathematical details of the Arce model.
The Arce (2007) Employer-Worker Model
After reviewing the model and its known equilibria, we write out the state-contingent payoffs and specify dynamics. Then we assess the dynamic stability of all equilibria.
Elements of the model
Each Employer (row player) in a large population is randomly matched with one Worker (column player). There are two possible types of workers: Type 1 or self-interested (comprising a fraction ϕ ∈ [0, 1] of the population) and Type 2 or autonomy-preferring (fraction 1 − ϕ). Either type of worker decides only whether to work (W) or shirk (S); the respective mixture probabilities are 5 denoted q j and 1 − q j for each type j = 1, 2. 1 Thus workers' type-contingent strategy space is
Each Employer decides whether to monitor (M) or not (N); the mixture probabilities are p and 1 − p respectively. Thus Employer's strategy space is [0, 1] and the state of the system is a vector Table 1 shows the payoffs. The Employer receives gross payoff v > 0 when the worker works, offset by the wage w > 0 paid to the worker and by the monitoring cost m > 0. Note that in this model, the Employer is unable to condition the wage on the level of output. Workers who work incur an effort cost e > 0. In addition to these material payoffs, a Type 2 worker receives a utility increment (+α) when her Employer does not monitor and a symmetric decrement (−α) with monitoring. In the case that a worker shirks and gets caught, her payoff is equal to zero. The parametric restrictions
ensure that shirking is not a dominant strategy and eliminate other trivial cases. Arce (2007) sets wage at the value w = √ vm that maximizes the Employer's expected payoff; in this case (1) implies restrictions on the gross payoff v. 
Arce notes that if all workers are known to be Type 1, then the unique Nash equilibrium is mixed: p = p * = e/w ; q 1 = q * 1 = (w − m)/w. He also notes that if all workers are known to be Type 2, there is again a mixed NE in which p = p * * = (α − e)/(2α − w), q 2 = q * 2 = (w − m)/w, 1 The monomorphic interpretation of a mixture probability q j is that every type j player adopts exactly the same mixed strategy q j W + (1 − q j )S. The polymorphic interpretation is that a fraction q j of the type j players adopt the pure strategy W and the rest adopt the pure strategy S. The analysis below works for either interpretation, as well as for the more general interpretation that there is a distribution of pure and mixed strategies among the the type j players with overall mean q j . 6 as well as two pure NE: one at (N,W ) or p = 0, q 2 = 1 and the other at (M, S) or p = 1, q 2 = 0.
Expected payoffs and utilities
Which equilibria, if any, are dynamically stable? Before introducing evolutionary dynamics to answer that question, we set the stage by writing out expected payoffs and utilities.
The Employer's expected payoff ω P in equation (2) below arises from receiving v when the employee works (probability ϕq 1 + (1 − ϕ)q 2 ), minus the monitoring costs incurred (with probability p) and the wages paid to the worker. Recall from Table 1 that the Employer pays w unless he monitors and the worker shirks, an event of probability p(
Both types of workers receive material payoff w − e if they work (probability q i ) or w in the event that they do not work (1 − q i ) and the Employer does not monitor (1 − p). For the selfinterested worker (type 1), expected utility coincides with expected material payoff ω A1 , which is therefore
Similarly, material payoff for Type 2 worker is
while her expected utility includes the preference parameter α and is
Dynamic adjustment equations
Recall that the state space is four dimensional, and specifies the fraction ϕ of type 1 workers, Employer's mixing probability (p) and workers' mixing probabilities (q j ). We therefore specify dynamics as a system of four coupled ordinary differential equations (ODEs), derived from ex-7 pected payoffs using standard evolutionary principles.
Arce (2007, p.718) comments, "This then begs the question, what determines the initial dis-
tribution of agent types?" and cites several exogenous factors. For our purposes it is better to complete the model by endogenizing the distribution ϕ. We invoke the basic principle of evolution that the type with higher material pyoff (= fitness) will increase its share of the population.
More specifically, 2 we impose standard continuous time replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988) , which postulate that the growth rateφ/ϕ of the share of self-interested workers is proportional (with rate constant β ϕ ) to its payoff ω A1 relative to the population average (ω). Equation (6) and other equations below use the fact that relative payoff can be written as
Thusφ is equal to
The remaining equations apply replicator dynamics for the mixture probabilities p, q 1 and q 2 .
Thus the system of four coupled ODEs iṡ
where the parameters w, e, m, α, and β are exogenous.
As noted earlier, we assume that the mixing probabilities adjust more rapidly than the type distribution ϕ, i.e., that β >> β ϕ > 0. The restrictions (1) apply to parameters w, e, m, α (or to v, e, m, α if w is chosen by the square root formula). To complete the dynamic specification, take the initial state as given and impose the boundary conditions 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, 0 ≤ q j ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1.
Given only two possible strategies for each type of player (and thus a probability distribution described by one variable) and random matching (and therefore expected payoffs linear in the relevant proportions), the payoff differences across strategies, e.g.,
with the payoff gradients, e.g.,
Thus the equations for the mixture probabilities can also be reinterpreted as gradient dynamics supplemented by a binomial variance factor.
Dynamic behavior
Describing the dynamic behavior of a system of 4 ordinary differential equations depending on 8 exogenous parameters sounds like a complicated task. However, for our purposes it suffices to identify the dynamically stable equilibrium (DSE) points -the subset of rest points or steady states that are Lyapunov stable. That is, we seek steady states (states for which the right hand side of the ODE system is zero) such that a solution of the ODE system with initial condition sufficiently close to the steady state will remain close to the steady state forever. The idea is that only neighborhoods of DSE are likely to be empirically relevant; elsewhere behavior is transient and will be hard to identify in field data.
Two technical remarks are in order before proceeding. First, Lyapunov stability does not guarantee asymptotic stability, i.e., does not guarantee that the solution above actually converges to the DSE as t → ∞. Second, it is well known that Nash equilibria (NE) are a subset of steady states (or dynamic equilibria, DE); see for example Weibull, 1995, Proposition 3.4. 3 It is also well known that DSE are a subset of NE and that, for smooth systems of ODEs like (6 -9), a necessary condition for DSE is that the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the NE has no eigenvalues with positive real part and a sufficient condition is that all eigenvalues have negative real parts; see for example Hirsch and Smale, 1974, Chapter 9. Eigenvalues with zero real part suggest (but do not guarantee) Lyapunov stability, and suggest (again with no guarantees) failure of asymptotic stability. 4 We will therefore use the following algorithm to identify DSE:
• find all DE, separately checking corners, edges, faces and interior of the state space;
• identify the subset of DE that are NE, and eliminate the others;
• find the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of (6 -9) evaluated at each NE, and eliminate any NE which yields an eigenvalue with positive real part; and
• identify as locally stable (and therefore empirically relevant) any NE whose eigenvalues all have negative real parts, and use numerical methods to assess the dynamic stability of any remaining NE that yields an eigenvalue with zero real part.
To begin, recall that by definition a DE for the present model is a solution tȯ
To sort out the many solutions, recall that our state vector The first step in the algorithm, then, gives us 16 corner DE. Checking all edges and faces sounds tedious, but the special structure of the model allows shortcuts. When ϕ = 0 (or 1), the value of q 1 (or q 2 ) is irrelevant, so 8 of the edges and all 16 corners are subsumed in the DE subset
Section 2.1 that only the last two cases are pure NE in the restricted (ϕ = 0, 1 face) games, so we can eliminate the other six cases as dynamically unstable. Indeed, the same argument allows us to eliminate edge DE in all of these faces. So the only remaining edges are of the form (i) ϕ ∈ (0, 1) and (ii) p, q 1 , q 2 ∈ {0, 1}. From equations (10) and (6) we see that (i) entails either p = w/e (which is inconsistent with (ii)) or q 1 = q 2 , which is "pure pooling" by (ii). But p = 1 and q 1 = 0 are not mutual best responses, nor are (p, q 1 ) = (0, 1) and (p, q 2 ) = (1, 1). Hence there are no edge DE.
are a far more elegant way to establish stability properties, but there is no systematic way of finding such functions. Therefore, as noted below, we favor numerical methods to deal with the problem, and often these methods provide further insights.
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The Appendix collects arguments of a similar character that show the full set of NE is 5
Here x is in some parameter-dependent subset of [0,1] specified as needed below, while p * = e/w, p * * = α−e 2α−w , and [hw] (or [lw]) in subscripts indicates that the state is a NE in the high wage region of parameter space w − 2e > 0 (or in the low wage region w − 2e < 0). The next step in the algorithm is to write out the Jacobian matrix (( ∂ RHS eq. i ∂ state var. j )), evaluated at each NE, and compute the eigenvalues. The Jacobian of ODE system (6 -9) is
As a warmup exercise, we compute the 2x2 Jacobian For these diagonal matrices, the diagonal entries are the eigenvalues and the parametric restrictions guarantee that all of them are negative. Hence these equilibria are both stable "sinks" with respect to dynamics restricted to the face. To assess overall stability, we have to look at the full Jacobian matrix and the Appendix shows that these include positive eigenvalues. Hence neither NE is a DSE. More intuitively, notice that the pure NE (0, 1, ·, 0) and (0, 0, ·, 1) can be destabilized by an invasion of Type 1 worker playing W and S, respectively.
The same Jacobian (sub)matrix evaluated at the mixed NE (0, p * * , ·, q * 2 ), where
whose eigenvalues are real and have opposite signs, since the parametric restrictions imply that 2α − w > 0. Therefore the equilibrium is an unstable saddle point even with respect to dynamics restricted to the face, and thus is not a DSE. More concretely, any mixed NE in this face will be unstable since it is a mixed equilibrium for the two-population replicator dynamics (see eg.
Weibull, 1997, Ch. 5).
The systematic way to assess stability is to evaluate the 4x4 Jacobian matrix at each NE. To illustrate, take the last NE listed, x, 
Simulation results
The last step in our algorithm is to investigate convergence behavior of the DSE candidate numerically. Since we do not expect asymptotic stability, we look for convergence in time average of the state variable S = (ϕ, p, q 1 , q 2 ). That is, we shall emphasize numerical approximations of lim t→∞ t −1´t 0 S(u)du, denoted byS(t), more than of lim t→∞ S(t). 6 We solve the ODE system numerically using Mathematica. 7 We set speeds of adjustment For these baseline parameters, the DSE candidate is (x, 0.50, 1 − The right panel of Figure 1 shows how the cycles amplify when the initial conditions are farther away from the equilibrium values even though we still obtain convergence in time average. In our example, the variability of q 1 decreases over time meanwhile p and ϕ have a roughly constant amplitude that is much higher than observed in the left panel. 6 Stability in time average is also emphasized in the equilibrium concept Time Average of the Shapley Polygon (TASP) proposed by Benaim, Hofbauer and Hopkins (2006). 7 The codes are available upon request. The other relevant case is the low wage equilibrium, (x, 0.50, 1 1.67x , 0), x ∈ [0.59, 1] for baseline parameters. Comparing the low wage case against the high wage case, notice that the mixing probability p is not altered given that we do not change drastically the level of wage. However, the small change of incentives will affect behavior and the minimum fraction of workers' types.
The type 1 worker will play close to the upper bound (before they were shirking) meanwhile type 2 worker shirks (before they were working). Also, the minimum level of type 1 workers increases from 0.39 to 0.59. Starting from values very close to the high wage case equilibrium (Panel left in Figure 1 ), we study the dynamics towards the new low wage equilibrium. with unique Nash equilibrium (N, D) yielding the inefficient outcome (0, 0). For v > c, however, the transformed game has a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (T, C) yielding the efficient outcome (1, 1) . The threat of vengeance rationalizes
Other's cooperation and Self's trust.
Can vengeful preferences evolve?
Vengeance thus may have a pro-social role, but is it viable? To answer the question properly (Samuelson, 2001), we 
Elements of the model
From this simple game, FS09 construct the noisy trust game illustrated in Figure 4 . Nature chooses Self's non-vengeful type v = 0 with probability 1 − x, or else chooses a given vengeful type v = v H > 0 with probability x. We assume that there are only two types, fixed in the short-run but variable in the long-run. 8 Nature also independently chooses Other's perception as correct (s = 0 for v = 0, or s = 1 for v = v H ) with probability 1 − a, or incorrect with probability a. The misperception probability depends negatively on the level of vengefulness (v H ):
where k > 0 represents a precision parameter explained in FS09. Let p 1 = Pr[T |v = v H ] denote the probability of trusting when Self is vengeful, and p 2 = Pr[T |v = 0] the probability of trusting when Self is non-vengeful. These probabilities are constrained by a tremble rate e ∈ (0, 1/2), so that e ≤ p 0 , p 1 ≤ 1 − e. Self's (mixed) strategy space is The equilibrium concept here is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). Proposition 1 of FS09 identifies seven families of PBE that depend on game parameters x, a, v H and e. More specifically, we will find different equilibria depending on the fraction of vengeful types. The pure strategy PBE equilibria lie on the 2-d faces p i ∈ {e, 1 − e} and q i ∈ {e, 1 − e}. In terms of the log ratio L(y) = log(1 − y)/ log(y) they are:
• "Separating," or p 2 = q 2 = e and
The mixed strategy PBE families lie on higher dimensional faces:
• "Bad Mix," or p 2 = q 2 = e and p 1 ,
• "Bad Hybrid," or p 2 = q 2 = e, p 1 = 1 − e and
The dynamic analysis will help us identify which equilibria persist in the long-run. As in the previous application, we start by constructing the expected payoffs and utilities.
Expected payoffs and utilities
The expected payoffs w v s and w s of vengeful and non-vengeful types of Self are:
The expected payoffs w s o or w o for Other when he perceives a vengeful or a non-vengeful type are:
Equation (13) is derived as follows. If vengeful Self does not trust (probability 1 − p 1 ), she receives a zero payoff. On the other hand, if she trusts (probability p 1 ), she gets payoff 1 or −1 − v depending on Other's decision and perception. Her payoff is 1 when Other correctly perceives (probability (1 − a) ) a vengeful type and cooperates (probability q 1 ), and also when Other misperceives (probability a) and cooperates (probability q 2 ). She gets −1 − v when Other perceives the vengeful type correctly (1 − a) and defects (1 − q 1 ); and when she misperceives (a) and defects (1 − q 2 ). Similar logic yields the expressions for non-vengeful Self's payoff w s as well as Other's possible expected payoffs w s o and w o .
Dynamic adjustment equations
Recall that the state space is six dimensional, and specifies the fraction of vengeful type (x), the degree of vengefulness (v) and four mixing probabilities (p i and q i ). We therefore specify dynamics as a system of six coupled ordinary differential equations (ODEs), derived from expected payoffs using standard evolutionary principles.
For the share x of vengeful types in the Self population, replicator dynamics postulate that the growth rateẋ/x is proportional (with rate constant β x ) to its own payoff w v s relative to the population average. The remaining state variables involve a continuum of alternatives. Here we rely on gradient dynamics. 10 Thus the degree of vengefulness v = v H for all vengeful players changes at a rate proportional to its gradient
As before, we use replicator dynamics for each mixing probability p i and q i . Its adjustment rate is proportional to its fitness difference, which coincides with its payoff gradient
. To shrink the range to [e, 1 − e], we include factors (1 − e − p i )(p i − e), analogous to the binomial factors
. Thus our system of six ODEs is:
We assume as usual that p i and q i adjust more rapidly than does x, and that v adjusts least rapidly (perhaps via genetic disposition and/or internalized norms). Thus 0 < β v < β x < β . To complete the dynamic specification, take the initial state as given and impose the boundary condi-
10 The evolution of continuous biological traits is commonly modeled via gradient dynamcs (e.g., Wright (1949) , Lande (1976) and Kauffman (1993) ) or by Dieckmann's restricted version mentioned in the introduction. Continuous strategy sets are seen less often in economics, but there is a cluster of papers beginning with Oechssler and Riedel (2001) that applies the continuous extension of the replicator equation. However, economists going back at least to Sonnenschein (1982) have also applied gradient dynamics. Friedman and Ostrov (2010) ) argue at length that gradient dynamics are more appropriate when larger changes per unit time are more difficult or expensive, while continuousstate replicator dynamics are more appropriate when adjustment is via deaths and births not spatially connected. 19 
Dynamic behavior
Which PBE remain when x and v H can adjust? To answer, FS09 proposes a static refinement called evolutionary perfect Bayesian equilibrium (EPBE). In EPBE, all types in the support of the distribution in each population achieve equal and maximal expected fitness, and no potential entrant (a type outside the support) has higher expected payoff. Proposition 2 of FS09 shows that only two states survive the EPBE refinement:
2 ), in which Self trusts regardless of her type and Other plays a specific mixed strategy when she perceives a non-vengeful type, 11 for the parameter values c ∈ (0, 1), e ∈ (0,ê(k)) and k ∈ (0, 0.6), 12 
and
• the "Bad Pooling" EPBE: S = (0, v, e, e, e, e), for all c > 0, and all behavioral errors rate e ∈ (0, 1/2), in which (apart from trembles) Self never trusts and Other always defects and v is arbitrary (and moot, since the vengeful type has population share zero).
Assuming the baseline parameters k = 0.4, c = 0.5, e = 0.05, β v = 0.001, β x = 0.10 and β = 2, the "Good Hybrid" is (0.69, 1.67, 0.95, 0.95, 0.95, 0.87). Of the 6 eigenvalues, 3 are negative, 1 is zero and 2 are pure imaginary. Thus we surmise that the good EPBE typically is neutrally stable.
To investigate more carefully, we turn to numerical simulations. The dynamic convergence to the good EPBE is not due to an arbitrary selection of parameters. The dynamic analysis has two caveats. First, notice that in several cases, we do not drastically alter the initial state. Thus, our analysis focuses on local stability. Second, we must restrict the adjusment speeds appropriately (β v << β x ). This restriction is consistent with the idea from FS09 that slow cultural or genetic adjustment controls v, while exit and entry control x.
Simulation results
The "bad" EPBE is at the corner of the state space, where the mixing probabilities are at the lower bound e and the fraction of vengeful type x goes to zero. Liouville's theorem does not preclude direct convergence to a corner equilibrium. Indeed, from our previous analysis, when we start from x(0) < 0.15 (not many vengeful types) and q i (0) < 0.35 (a low probability that Other cooperates) the bad EPBE persists in the long-run.
Discussion
We have analyzed the dynamic stability of two games of incomplete information in the context of the evolution of preferences. We complement Arce's (2007) Perhaps the main contribution of the present paper is to illustrate a toolbox for investigating the dynamic stability of equilibrium in a wide class of games of incomplete information. The toolbox first asks the researcher to write down the expected payoffs and expected utilities for all feasible states. Then it applies standard evolutionary concepts to describe the evolution of types In view of the fact that asymptotic stability cannot be expected in key equilibria of games of incomplete information, the toolbox emphasizes convergence in time average and includes numerical methods. One can check robustness by sampling the economically feasible parameter space. Our toolbox also calls for appropriate restrictions on the adjustment speed parameters. For instance, in the FS09 game, slow cultural or genetic adjustment controls the type variable (the preference parameter v), while the exit and entry allow population shares to adjust at a moderate rate and individual learning allows very rapid adjustment of action mixtures.
Two remarks on modeling philosophy may be helpful to applied economists.
• The toolbox presented here omits some of the more advanced techniques from dynamical systems theory, such as center manifold techniques or bifurcation techniques, because we expect these will yield a lower return on applied researchers' investment. It also omits Lyapunov functions, since we can offer no systematic way of finding them.
• Mainstream analysis of games of incomplete information typically exogenously specifies the set of active types and the population shares of those types. Recall that section 2.4 already identified all corner and edge DE and the subset that are NE.
On the 2-d faces that lie inside the 3-d faces ϕ ∈ {0, 1}, section 2.1 noted that the only additional NE are the mixes (ϕ, p, q 1 , q 2 ) = (1, . Ruling out q 2 − q 1 = 0, 13 we see from (6) that p * = e/w. Consequently the only new candidate equilibria are (ϕ * , p * , 1, 0) and (ϕ * , p * , 0, 1).
The dynamics of q 2 depends on the sign of α(w−2e) w after plugging p * in (9) . The case w − 2e > 0 is called high incentive wages, and yields the q * 2 = 1 equilibrium, while low incentive wages, the case w − 2e < 0, yields the equilibrium above with q * 2 = 0.
We have already found all NE in the 3-d faces ϕ ∈ {0, 1}. The 3-d faces p ∈ {0, 1} have no NE, since q j is strictly mixing for states in such faces, and therefore p = p * by (9), contradicting p ∈ {0, 1}. Similarly, the faces q 1 ∈ {0, 1} contain no new NE since a strictly mixed strategy for q 2 implies p = p * * = (α − e)/(2α − w) which contradicts the solution of p * in (6). On the faces q 2 ∈ {0, 1} we pick up two new NE, (ϕ * , Finally, the interior points are unstable since we already know that the dynamics of q 2 depends on the sign of α(w−2e) w which forces it to 1 (or zero) in the case of high (or low) wage.
Evaluating the Jacobian matrix at the NE
The text analyzed stability for the first three NE and the last NE listed in (11) . In this section, we find Jacobian matrices and eigenvalues for the remaining NE. 13 Notice that if both mixing probabilities are pure and q 2 −q 1 = 0, the best reply p is also pure and thus the dynamics is not on a 2-d face.
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The Jacobian matrix for (6 -9) this equilibrium is not a DSE. Notice that this result also follows from the fact that q 2 = 1 is not a best-reply for p = 1.
